Tuesday, 10 June 2014

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Judges must interpret and understand legislation before applying. Statutory interpretation is the process by which court interpret and apply legislation. The following circumstances might lead to a need for statutory interpretation;
·         Ambiguity – This might be caused by an error in drafting or word may have dual meaning.
·         Uncertainty – may arise where words of a statute are intended to apply to a range of factual situations and the courts must decide whether the case before them falls into any of those situations.
·         There may be unforeseeable development.
·         The legislation may use a broad term.

Courts have developed principles to assist them in ascertaining the meaning of statutes. Some of the principles 1are referred to as rules. However, they do not have the binding the binding force of law.

These principles can be 3divided into four categories;

·         Primary rules

·         Secondary rules

·         Extrinsic aids

·         Presumption

1.    Primary rules of statutory interpretation


Nature of primary rule


The primary rules deal with the courts’ overall approach to interpretation. The following are the primary rules;


a)    The literal rule

This rule requires the court to give the words of a statute their plain meaning. It is for a court to interpret Parliament’s intention from what it has actually said – not from what it thinks it meant to say.

Whiteley v Chappell (1868-69) LR 4 QB 147 - It was a statutory offence to impersonate “any person entitled to vote” at an election. The defendant impersonated someone who was on the electoral register but who had died before the election. He was acquitted as deceased persons had no right to vote in the election.

b)   The golden rule

This rule is an extension of the literal rule.

It allows the court to depart from the literal rule where this would produce and obviously absurd result.

McMonagle v Westminster City Council [1990] 1 All ER 285 - McMonagle was charged with using premises as a 'sex encounter establishment' without a licence, contrary to the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982. The definition of such an establishment was “premises at which performances which are not unlawful are given which...comprise the sexual stimulation of persons admitted to the premises...” McMonagle's defence was that the prosecution had not proved that the performance in question were not unlawful. As they may have been unlawful he would not therefore have required a licence and he was not therefore guilty of the offence! The House of Lords rejected this interpretation as being absurd. The words “which are not unlawful” had been introduced by an incompetent draftsman simply to emphasize that the grant of a licence conferred no immunity from the criminal law

c)     The mischief rule

The Mischief Rule can be applied by the courts to resolve an ambiguity which is produced by the application of the Literal Rule. It involves asking what ‘mischief’ in the common law, was intended to be corrected by the statute. The court then applies the interpretation which is consistent with correcting the mischief.


In Cockery v Carpenter, the court held that a bicycle was a ‘carriage’ for the purposes of the Licensing Act 1872 where a defendant was charged with the offence of cycling whilst intoxicated. The purpose of the act was to prevent people who are intoxicated from operating any form of transport on public roads.


d)   The purposive approach


The Purposive Approach to statutory interpretation can be seen as an extension of the Mischief Rule. Instead of confining itself simply to the mischief which the statute was intended to correct, the court resolves ambiguities by reference to the statute’s overall purpose.


e)    The contextual rule

The contextual rule means that a word should be construed in its context. It is permissible to look at the statute as a whole to discover the meaning of a word in it.

2.    Secondary rules of statutory interpretation


Nature of secondary rules


The secondary rules are concerned, less with the overall approach to interpretation, and more with the precise application and structure of language within the statute.


a)      The ejusdem  generis rule (of the same class)

Where general words follow particular words, the general words are construed as being limited to the subject matter of the class outlined by the particular words.


Powell v Kempton Park Racecourse Co Ltd[1899] AC 143 - A statute prohibited the keeping of “a house, office, room or other place” for betting. The defendant kept an uncovered enclosure for betting. The House of Lords held that he was not in breach of the statute. The enclosure was not an “other place” within the meaning of the statute. It was not ejusdem generis with the particular places previously listed as they were all indoor places.


b)     Noscitur a socis

(‘The meaning of a word can be gathered from its context’.) Words draw meaning from words around them. Thus if a statute mentioned children books, children toys, and clothes, it would be reasonable to assume that clothes meant children’s clothes.


c)      In pari materia

If a statute forms part of a series of statutes that deals with similar subject matter, the court may look to the interpretation of the previous statute on the assumption that parliament intended the same thing.

3.    Presumptions


Certain presumptions of statutory interpretation have developed over the years. In the absence of a clear contrary intention within the statute the courts will presume that Parliament intended the statute to have the meaning favored by the presumption. All presumptions may be rebutted by clear contrary wording in the statute.

Examples of some particular presumptions;

·         A statute does not alter existing common law

·         If a statute deprives a person of his property, he is to be compensated for its value.

·         A statute is not intended to deprive a person of his liberty. If it does so, clear words must be used.

·         A statute does not have retrospective effect.

·         A statute does not oust the jurisdiction of courts

4.    Extrinsic and intrinsic aids to interpretation


a)    Extrinsic aids

Extrinsic aids to interpretation are those which come from outside the statute which is being interpreted. They include;

·         Dictionaries

·         Reports of Law Commissions, Royal Commission, the Law Reform Committee or other official committees.

·         Hansard – the official record of parliamentary debates. In Pepper v Hart, it was decided that it is acceptable to look at the original speech which first introduced a Bill to ascertain its meaning, but only if the statute is ambiguous or obscure or its literal meaning would lead to absurdity.

b)   Intrinsic aids

Intrinsic aids to statutory interpretation consist of;

·         The long title of the an Act, which may give guidance to the overall objectives of the of the Act.

·         The Preamble of an Act often directs the judge as to its intentions ad objectives.

·         Interpretation sections of the Act.

·         Side note.




                                                                                                 

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